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CASE COMMENTS
SPEEDY TRIAL AND PRE-TRIAL INCARCERATION
The sixth amendment of the United States Constitution guaran-
tees a speedy trial to those accused of crime.1 However, no definite
time period is prescribed within which their trial must be com-
menced,2 and a determination of whether the right has been violated
must be made on the basis of the circumstances of each particular
case.3 As a result, the provision has been a constant source of litiga-
tion in the federal courts.4
"'In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial ..... U.S. Const. amend. VI. See United States v. Fox, 3 Mont. 512 (1880),
for a discussion of the origin and development of the protection. See generally, Note,
57 Colum. L. Rev. 846 (1957); Note, 5 Stan. L. Rev. 95 (1952); 64 Yale L.J. io8
(1955)-
-It is usually said that the right to a speedy trial accrues only after an accused
has been formally charged with a crime. Prior to that, the Government is bound
only by the statute of limitations on the particular crime, and may seek to have
the accused indicted at any time within the applicable period. Harlow v. United
States, 3oi F.2d 361 (sth Cir. 1962); Foley v. United States, 290 F.2d 562 (8th Cir.
1961); Hoopengarner v. United States, 27o F.2d 465 (6th Cir. 1959); D'Aquino v.
United States, 192 F.2d 338 (9 th Cir. 1951); United States v. Hunter Pharmacy, Inc.,
213 F. Supp. 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); United States v. Hanlin, 29 F.R.D. 481 (W.D.
Mo. 1962); United States v. Abrams, 29 F.R.D. 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). But see Mann
v. United States, 3o4 F.2d 394, 396 n4 (D.C. Cir. 1962) where the court said, "While
the point is not important here, we note that in our view, and contrary to some
recent opinion .... the Constitutional guarantee protects against undue delays
in presenting formal charge as well as delays between indictment and trial." See
also United States v. Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183 (D. Md. 1955)-
TPollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354 (1957); Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77
(igo5); United States v. Graham, 289 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1961); United States ex rel.
Hanson v. Ragen, 166 F.2d 6o8 (7 th Cir. 1948); MacKnight v. United States, 263
Fed. 832 (1st Cir. 1920); United States v. Palermo. 27 F.R.D. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
'It has been held that the sixth amendment does not apply to the states. Gaines
v. Washington, 277 U.S. 81 (1928); Phillips v. Nash, 311 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1962);
Falkowski v. Mayo, 173 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1949); United States ex rel. Von Cseh v.
Fay, 195 F. Supp. 432 (S.D.N.Y. ig6i); Chick v. Kentucky, 140 F. Supp. 418 (E.D.
Ky. 1956); Copley v. Sweet, 133 F. Supp. 502 (W.D. Mich. 1955); Ex parte Whistler,
65 F. Supp. 40 (E.D. Wis. 1945); Ex parte Barnard, 52 F. Supp. io02 (E.D. Ill. 1943).
Nevertheless, some federal cases proceed under the assumption that state criminal
defendants are protected by the sixth amendment. Mattoon v. Rhay, 313 F.2d 683
(9th Cir. 1963); Nelson v. Sacks, 290 F.2d 604 (6th Cir. 1961); Suit v. Ellis, 282
F.2d 145 5th Cir. 196o); Gordon v. Overlade, 143 F. Supp. 577 (N.D. Ind. 1956).
It seems clear that if the delay in a state court is too flagrant, it runs afoul of the
fourteenth amendment. Hughes v. Heinze, 268 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1959); Petition
of Sawyer, 229 F.2d 8o5 (7th Cir. 1956); Germany v. Hudspeth, 209 F.2d 15 (ioth
1964] CASE COMMENTS 279
In the recent case of Smith v. United States,5 the accused was ar-
rested in Washington, D. C. October 24, 1961, on a narcotics charge.
Unable to make bail, he was confined in jail to await trial. He was
indicted November 1,, arraigned November 17, and trial was set for
January 3, 1962. But a succession of six continuances delayed trial
until April 16, 1962, five months after indictment. Upon conviction,
defendant appealed, alleging that he was denied a speedy trial. The
appeal was heard by a division 6 of the United States Court of Appeals,
District of Columbia Circuit, and decided in defendant-appellant's
favor7 His conviction was vacated and the indictment dismissed.8
Subsequently, on the Government's motion, a rehearing en banc was
ordered, at which time the opinion and order of the three-judge divis-
ional court were withdrawn. Upon rehearing, it was held that there
was no violation of defendant's right to a speedy trial, although his
conviction was reversed on other grounds.
Failure to receive a speedy trial as guaranteed by the sixth amend-
ment has been frequently asserted by criminal defendants when chal-
lenging their convictions. But in the overwhelming majority of cases,
the plea has not been well taken. There are two main reasons for this.
First, the courts have consistently held that the provision guaran-
teeing a speedy trial confers only a personal right, which may be
Cir. 1954); In re Kominski, 168 F. Supp. 836 (D. Del. 1958). Anyway most states
guarantee a speedy trial in criminal cases. The exceptions are Massachusetts, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New York, and North Carolina. Note, 57 Colum. L. Rev. 846, 847
n.7 (1957). Furthermore, many states provide a definite time period within which
trial must be had. See Note, 57 Colum. L. Rev. 846, 852 n.35 (1957) for examples.
Also, some cases intimate that the right applies in court-martial cases. Gorko v.
Commanding Officer, Second Air Force, 314 F.2d 858 (ruth Cir. 1963); Day v. Davis,
235 F.2d 379 (roth Cir. 1956); Sima v. United States, 96 F. Supp. 932 (Ct. CL. 195).
Compare Ex Parte Benton, 63 F. Supp. 8o8 (N.D. Cal. 1945).
5No. 17106 D.C. Cir., Feb. 20o, 1964.
rThe Court was composed of Edgerton, Senior Circuit Judge and Danaher and
Wright, Circuit Judges.
7No. 17106, D.C. Cir., Aug 15, 1963.
sFederal courts have inherent power to dismiss an indictment for lack of a
speedy trial. Ex parte Altman, 34 F. Supp. io6 (S.D. Cal. 194o). But the matter has
been complicated by Rule 48(b) Fed. R. Crim. P., which authorizes the court to
dismiss for want of prosecution. Dismissal pursuant to the sixth amendment bars
reprosecution for the same offense, Mann v. United States, 3o4 F.2d 394 (D.C. Cir.
1962). Dismissal pursuant to Rule 48(b) does not prevent reprosecution, Mann v.
United States, 3o4 F.2d at 397-98. Also, there is some question whether a dismissal
under Rule 48(b) is appealable, United States v. Apex Distrib. Co., 27 o F.2d 747
(9 th Cir. 1959). Cf., United States v. Gunther, 259 F.2d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1958). See
also United States v. McWilliams, 163 F.2d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1947) and United States v.
Palermo, 27 F.R.D. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
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waived.9 The courts have been quick to find waiver upon a showing
of inaction on the part of defendant in failing to demand a speedy
trial.' 0 It has also been held that where the defendant does not ob-
ject to delays, he impliedly acquiesces in them and is thereby barred
from later complaining of them.".
Second, most courts have taken a very liberal view as to what
constitutes a speedy trial. Perhaps the most influential decision in this
area has been Beavers v. Haubert,2 a United States Supreme Court
case, wherein the Court said, "The right of a speedy trial is necessarily
relative. It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances.
It secures rights to a defendant. It does not preclude the rights of
public justice."' 3 This language has been frequently cited in later
decisions.' 4 Where the delay has been long, some courts have said that
it must be shown that defendant's case has not been prejudiced, al-
though it is not clear who has the burden of proof on the issue.'0 Gen-
9United States v. Lustman, 258 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1958); Fouts v. United States,
253 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1958); Chinn v. United States, 228 F. 2d 151 (4th Cir. 1955);
Campodonico v. United States, 222 F.2d 31o (9 th Cir. 1955); Shepherd v. United
States, 163 F.2d 974 (8th Cir. 1947); Collins v. United States, 157 F.2d 409 (9th Cir.
1946).
'0Danziger v. United States, 161 F.2d 299 (gth Cir. 1947); O'Brien v. United
States, 25 F.2d 90 (7th Cir. 1928); Poffenbarger v. United States, 20 F.2d 42 (8th
Cir. 1927); United States v. Fassoulis, 179 F. Supp. 645 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Ex parte
Pickerill, 44 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Tex. 1942). Some courts are stricter in their appli-
cation of the doctrine of waiver than others. Compare United States v. Patrisso, 21
F.R.D. 363 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) and United States v. Dillon, 183 F. Supp. 541 (S.D.N.Y.
196o). See also United States v. Chase, 135 F. Supp. 230 (N.D. Ill. 1955). It is at least
proper, if not necessary to bring mandamus if attempts to secure a speedy trial fail.
Miller v. Overholser, 206 F.2d 415 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Fowler v. Hunter, 164 F.2d 668
(loth Cir. 1947); United States ex rel Coleman v. Cox, 47 F.2d 988 (5 th Cir. 1931);
Frankel v. Woodrough, 1o F.2d 36o (8th Cir. 1926).
"Pietch v. United States, 11o F.2d 817 (loth Cir. 1940); Daniels v. United States,
17 F.2d 339 (9 th Cir. 1927); Worthington v. United States, i F.2d 154 (7th Cir. 19.4);
Phillips v. United States, 2o Fed. 259 (8th Cir. 1912); United States v. Wai Lau,
215 F. Supp. 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); United States v. Stein, 18 F.R.D. 17 (S.D.N.Y.
1955). Of course if the defendant causes the delay, he cannot complain of it. Pate
v. United States, 297 F.2d 166 (8th Cir. 1962); Dandridge v. United States, 265 F. 2d
349 (D.C. Cir. 1959); United States v. Postma, 242 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1957); Morland
v. United States, 193 F.2d 297 (loth Cir. 1951); Hart v. United States, 183 Fed. 368
(6th Cir. 191o); Hollman v. Wilkinson, 124 F. Supp. 849 (M.D. Pa. 1954).
1'198 U.S. 77 (195o).
"Id. at 87.
"Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 361 (1957); United States v. Graham,
289 F.2d 352, 353 (7th Cir. ig6i); United States ex rel. Hanson v. Ragen, 166
F.2d 608, 61o (7th Cir. 1948); MacKnight v. United States, 263 Fed. 832, 835 (1st
Cir. 1920); United States v. Palermo, 27 F.R.D. 393, 395 (S.D.N.Y. ig6i).
15United States v. Farley, 292 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1961); United States v. Lustman,
258 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1958); United States v. Kaye, 251 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1958);
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erally, the federal courts have been very indulgent with dilatory
prosecutions. Only a few federal court cases16 have upheld the con-
tention of a denial of the right to a speedy trial pursuant to the sixth
amendment. However, all these cases were decided after 1954, allow-
ing the speculation that the law in this area is in transition.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit has been particularly active in this area. Three comparatively
recent cases from that court have found a violation of the right to a
speedy trial. In each of these cases, however, the delay was great and
the unfairness apparent.17 Then, in 1959, the Court decided King v.
United States,ls where the delay was only 14o days from arraignment
to trial (144 days from indictment to trial). The Court, sitting en banc,
found that there was no denial of a speedy trial.'9 The majority, how-
ever, stressed the fact that the delays were not caused by the prosecu-
tion,20 and carefully distinguished cases in which the delays were
caused by the prosecution. It said, "Cases such as United States v.
Provoo, Taylor v. United States, United States v. McWilliams, and
United States v. Chase, cited by appellant, are not applicable here,
because the delays involved in those cases were attributable to the
prosecution." 2'
The inference is inescapable that a more serious question would
Williams v. United States, 25o F.2d 19 (D.C. Cir. 1957); United States v. Holmes,
168 F.2d 888 (3d Cir. 1948); United States v. Shelton, 211 F. Supp. 869 (D.D.C. 1962).
"United States v. Gunther, 259 F.2d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Williams v. United
States, 25o F.2d i9 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Taylor v. United States, 238 F.2d 259 (D.C.
Cir. 1956); United States v. Dillon, 183 F. Supp. 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); United States
v. Barnes, 175 F. Supp. 6o (S.D. Cal. 1959); United States v. Chase, 135 F. Supp.
23o (N.D. Ill. 1955); United States v. Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183 (D. Md. 1955). One other
case is United States v. Fox, 3 Mont. 512 (880), which was decided by the Supreme
Court of the Montana Territory. This appears to be the first case to find a violation
of the sixth amendment guarantee of a speedy trial. There have also been some
cases dismissed under Rule 48(b) for lack of prosecution, a different ground from
lack of a speedy trial. See e.g., United States v. Apex Distrib. Co., 270 F.-d 747
(gth Cir. 1959); United States v. McWilliams, 163 F.2d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1947); United
States v. Pack, 20 F.R.D. 209 (D. Del. 1957).
" United States v. Gunther, supra note 16 (six year delay); Williams v. United
States, supra note 16 (seven year delay from indictment to trial); Taylor v. United
States, supra note 16 (six year delay from date of crime to date of trial).
19265 F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
"'Ihe court was divided five to four. See dissenting opinion at 571.
2'It is argued that the view we support proceeds from the premise that none
of the delay in the case at bar was caused by the prosecutor, an inadequate premise.
Our reasoning does not so proceed. The non-involvement of the prosecutor is merely
one of the features of the case." 265 F.2d at 570. It appears, however, that it was the
most compelling factor.
"265 F.2d at 569.
19641
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have been presented if the delays had been caused by the prosecution.
That situation was squarely presented in the appeal heard by the three-
judge divisional court, since the majority there found that the delays
were caused entirely by the prosecution (except for one day, caused
by the crowded criminal court calendar). The majority found for the
defendant on this ground. Referring to the above quoted language
from King, the court said:
"This implies that if the delays involved in the King case had
been attributable to the prosecution they would have raised a
serious constitutional question. Since the delays in the present
case are attributable to the prosecution and in other respects
are similar to those in King, that question is before us.
We answer the constitutional question in favor of the ap-
pellant and do not reach his other contentions. Because his
right to a speedy trial was denied, the judgment of conviction
must be vacated and the indictment dismissed." 22
The interesting aspect of this holding is that the motives of the
prosecution in procuring the delays were not inquired into. Other
federal cases have stated that for a delay caused by the prosecution to
be improper, it must be shown that it was procured deliberately, with
the intent to vex the defendant.23 The decision was unprecedented
in the weight it gave to the fact that the delays were caused by the
prosecution, without an inquiry into the motives.
The other basis for the decision of the original panel was the fact
that the defendant was imprisoned from the time of his arrest until
the time of his trial, a span of six months, because he was unable to
make bond.24 It had never been clear, prior to that decision, to what
extent pre-trial incarceration of a defendant was a factor in the speedy
trial problem.2 5 This raises the question as to whether an incarcerated





No. 17106, p. 6, D.C. Cir., Aug. 15, 1963.
m'Davidson v. United States, 312 F.2d 163 (8th Cir. 1963); United States v. Hill,
3io F.2d 6oi (4th Cir. 1962); Bullock v. United States, 265 F.2d 683 (6th Cir. 1959);
United States v. Provoo 17 F.R.D. 183, 197 (D. Md. 1955); United States v. Fox, 3
Mont. 512 (188o).
"APre-trial incarceration is to be distinguished from incarceration pursuant to
a prior conviction. The latter problem was recently discussed in Comment, Convict's
Right to Speedy Trial on a Pending Indictment, 21 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 128 (1964).
2xo8 U. Pa. L. Rev. 414, 416, n.6 (196o). See also United States ex rel. Whitaker
v. Henning, 15 F.2d 760, 761 (9th Cir. 1926).
"Sometimes a mentally incompetent defendant is held in a mental institution
either to determine his capacity to stand trial, or until he becomes fit to stand
trial. It is generally held that such delays do not run afoul the sixth amendment.
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In King, the defendant was in jail from the time of his arrest until
the time of his trial, a period of six months, but this matter was noted
by the majority only in passing. The Court said, "We do suggest that
the District Court give the problem continuing attention, especially
in respect to defendants held in jail."27 The matter was discussed
more fully in the dissenting opinion, in which Circuit Judge Bazelon
said:
"Here the appellant was in jail, as if serving sentence, though
not tried and though presumed to be innocent until convicted.
He was not free on bail bond. The system accordingly operated
to the prejudice of appellant by depriving him of liberty for
substantial period of time .... 2
The pre-trial imprisonment situation was again presented in Porter
v. United States.2 9 There the defendant was indicted on December 23,
1957, and tried on May 20, 1958, after five postponements. The de-
fendant was in jail from the time of his arrest November 28, 1957, until
his trial, a period of six months, because he was unable to furnish
bail. The imprisonment aspect was again passed over by the majority,
who decided against defendant on his plea of denial of a speedy trial.
Again Judge Bazelon dissented.30
Judge Bazelon's view of the imprisonment aspect of the speedy trial
problem seems to have prevailed upon the original three-judge panel
in the Smith case. The majority said:
"Because he could not buy a $25oo bail bond the appellant
was imprisoned, despite the legal presumption of innocence,
while he waited to be tried. This means that for nearly six
months he was imprisoned not because he was guilty but be-
cause he was poor.... In our opinion the right to a speedy
trial includes, in the circumstances of this case, a right not to
be kept in jail for months without trial for the convenience of
the prosecution." 31
In the present case the Court, sitting en banc, took, a different
view than did the majority of the original three-judge panel, not only
of the facts of the case, but of the law on the subject of speedy trial.
United States ex rel. Ciehala v. LaVallee, 312 F.2d 3o8 (2d Cir. 1963); Howard v.
United States, 261 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1958); Barfield v. Settle, 209 F. Supp. 143
(W.D. Mo. 1962); Petition of Daniels, 15o F. Supp. 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); United
States v. Miller, 131 F. Supp. 88 (D. Vt. 1955). However, the detention must not
be unreasonably long. Williams v. United States, 25o F.2d 19 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
-%265 F.2d at 569.
-'Id. at 572.
227o F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
wIbid.
IaNo. 17106, P. 5, D.C. Cir., Aug. 15, 1963.
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First, the Court found that the delays were not all caused by the
prosecution. It found that the tactics of the defendant contributed sub-
stantially to the delay.3 2 This would seem to have been sufficient rea-
son to reverse the prior decision, on the reasoning of the King case. But
the Court went further. It said:
"We do not assess the resolution of the issue simply in terms of
'fault.' Rather, weighing all the 'circumstances,' as we are bound
to do, there is not on this record a showing of such oppression or
of purposeful, vexatious or arbitrary action as amounts to a
deprivation of the appellant's constitutional right."33
This language seems clear. The Court is rejecting the test of the
King case, as interpreted by the original three-judge court in the pres-
ent appeal. The test is not who caused the delay, or who was at "fault"
in causing it. Instead, the court will test the motives of the prosecution
in seeking the delay. If the delay is sought for the purpose of oppres-
sing or vexing the defendant, violation of the right will be found, pro-
viding the delay is sufficient. If, on the other hand, the delay is either
unavoidable, or reasonable under the circumstances, no violation will
be found, unless perhaps the delay is unreasonably long.
Second, the majority opinion does not mention in its discussion of
the speedy trial issue, the fact that defendant was imprisoned pending
trial, although this is the prime consideration in the dissenting opin-
ion of Circuit Judge Wright.3 4 Whether the Court's silence on this
point can be interpreted as a rejection of the argument that incar-
cerated defendants are entitled to a more speedy trial than defendants
free on bail is perhaps conjectural. At least, the majority did not feel
the argument of sufficient merit so as to require affirmance of the
original appeal decision.
It is submitted that the test applied in the present case is the proper
one. That is, the court makes its determination on the basis of all the
circumstances of the case, not on the basis of one particular factor or
another. But it is also believed that the factor of pre-trial incarcera-
tion is a circumstance which should be considered by the court in
reaching its decision. At the present time there appears to be no
definitive treatment of pre-trial incarceration in the case law on the
subject of speedy trial. But the trend of recent cases, particularly in
the District of Columbia Circuit, makes it likely that pre-trial incar-
ceration will become recognized as a factor of significant importance
"No. 17106, p. i1, D.C. Cir., Feb. 20 1964.
3'Ibid.
3'Id. at 18.
